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At the start of December, President Trump hosted the leaders of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo for a truce. He promised an end to years of warfare in the turbulent eastern DRC, presenting it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations “to make a lot of money”.

Not long after, however, a starkly different approach to conflict emerged. It was declared that U.S. forces had conducted Christmas Day airstrikes in north-west Nigeria, striking sites linked to the Islamic State (IS). In a social media post, the President declared, “I have previously warned these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

A Defining Shift in Policy

These divergent actions highlights the defining principle of the U.S. engagement with sub-Saharan Africa in this period: a de-emphasis from advocating for democracy and human rights in favor of a avowed focus on trade and conflict resolution—though how this aligns with the nascent air campaign in Nigeria is yet unclear.

“We no longer see Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a slogan we’ve seen thrown around for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” said a high-ranking U.S. state department official in a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

A White House spokesperson stated this, commenting the President “has treated Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American capital, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations achieve stability, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Strategic Results and Inconsistencies

This pivot is significant, but observers warn it is early to gauge its impact. The approach is intertwined with the President’s unconventional diplomacy, which has included feuds with long-standing U.S. partners and insults directed at Africans.

“The core tenet is, if it’s in the immediate or future interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” said a scholar for Africa studies at a prominent foreign policy council.

Notable policy moves have included:

• Dismantling the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. An analysis estimates this could lead to millions of excess fatalities globally by 2030, with a significant portion in Africa.
• Implementing visa restrictions on citizens from more than two dozen African countries and suspending most refugee admissions.
• Implementing a global tariff campaign that has harmed African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Allowing a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to expire without renewal.

Diplomatic Disinterest and Friction

In contrast to his recent predecessors, the President avoided sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His most notable engagement with African affairs was dubbing nations on the continent with a derogatory term, which he later admitted using.

“The continent ranks dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for him, but for the administration in general,” said the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which allocated only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A notable disagreement has developed with South Africa, seemingly spurred by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The claim of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa resonates strongly now with U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” observed a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Quid Pro Quo Engagement and Selective Intervention

An analogous tension emerged with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This conflicted with Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation split between Christians and Muslims and riven with security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts said that the stern rhetoric may have spurred the government into more responsiveness on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had approved the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

The President has publicly expressed his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has mediated in the Congo conflict and dispatched a diplomat to try to forge a peace deal in Sudan’s civil war, as yet without success. While the Congo deal appeared to have been broken quickly, it “at least serves to introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” said one conflict expert.

A Resemblance to Other Powers

Experts characterize the new U.S. approach as paralleling that of global rivals like Russia and China, who have increased their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on strategic interests.

“It represents a belated recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” observed one foreign policy analyst.

In practice, the new approach likely means that “an African country that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The diplomacy that we are talking about does not seek to spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a business-oriented posture towards Africa,” the observer stated.